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NASA V. NELSON:
THE HIGH COURT FLYING HIGH
ABOVE THE RIGHT TO
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
Blythe Golay*
In 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court first acknowledged a potential
constitutional privacy “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters.” Since then, the Court has remained silent on whether there is
a right to informational privacy. In the October 2010 term, the Court
had another chance to revisit the contours of this potential privacy
interest in NASA v. Nelson. But it again refused to define those
contours and instead assumed, without deciding, that a constitutional
right to informational privacy exists. The Court held that although
information that was collected from an employee background-check
questionnaire implicated the employees’ putative right to informational
privacy, the Privacy Act of 1974 alleviated that privacy concern by
providing sufficient protection that prevents the nonconsensual
dissemination of information. This Comment argues that, in its reliance
on the Privacy Act, the Court improperly ignored the distinction
between compelled collection of information and dissemination of
information—and how both threaten a right to informational privacy.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., May 2009, Cornell
University. I would like to thank Professor John T. Nockleby for his invaluable and candid
guidance, not only with this Comment but throughout my time in law school. Thank you to the
members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, and a special thank you to Joshua Rich for
his trust, support, and unparalleled eye for editing. Most importantly, I want to thank my parents
and brothers, who have never ceased to encourage and inspire me.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Constitution does not expressly mention a right of
privacy.1 But the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the
Constitution creates certain “zones of privacy.”2 With respect to a
right to informational privacy, in 1977 the Court first acknowledged
a potential constitutional privacy “interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters.”3 In two cases—Whalen v. Roe4 and Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services5—the Court assumed, without
deciding, that the Constitution protects an informational privacy
interest.6 In both Whalen and Nixon, it held that whatever the limits
of that interest were, the statutes at issue did not unconstitutionally
invade the interest.7 More than thirty years later, the Court in
National Aeronautics & Space Administration v. Nelson8 (“Nelson”)
took the same approach and assumed, without deciding,9 that a
constitutional right to informational privacy exists—only to then
hold that a public employer who conducted an employee background
check did not violate that right.10 In so holding, the Court reasoned
that the Privacy Act of 197411 (the “Privacy Act”) afforded sufficient
protections against public dissemination, such that the challenged
background check did not violate contract employees’ (the
“Employees”) informational privacy interest.12

1. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976).
2. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973)).
3. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 599 (1977).
4. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
5. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
6. Id. at 457–58; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598–600.
7. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457 (holding that a statute that required former President Nixon to
submit papers and recordings was constitutional); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04 (holding that a
statute that required collection of drug-prescription information was constitutional).
8. 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011).
9. Id. at 751 (“We assume, without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right
of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon.”).
10. Id.
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
12. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 751 (“The Government’s interest as employer . . . , combined with
the protections against public dissemination provided by the Privacy Act . . . satisfy any ‘interest
in avoiding disclosure’ that may ‘arguably ha[ve] its roots in the Constitution.’” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599, 605)).
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This Comment explores Nelson and argues that the Court should
not have held that the Privacy Act sufficiently protected the
Employees’ informational privacy interest. Part II discusses the
procedural history and facts of Nelson. Part III describes the Court’s
reasoning in holding that the background check, in light of the
Privacy Act’s protections, did not violate a putative right to
informational privacy.13 Part IV argues that the “interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters,” that was first articulated in Whalen,14
encompasses both the Employees’ disclosure to NASA (the
“Government”)—collection of information—and the Government’s
disclosure to the public—dissemination of information.15 While the
Court chose to focus only on the latter,16 both disclosures threaten an
informational privacy interest, and the Privacy Act is inadequate to
protect either.
II. STATEMENT OF
THE CASE
The background check at issue in Nelson consisted of two form
questionnaires: Standard Form 85 (“SF-85”) and the Investigative
Request for Personal Information, Form 42 (“Form 42”).17 SF-85
seeks, in addition to basic biographical information,18 information on
whether the individual “used, possessed, supplied, or manufactured
illegal drugs” in the last year.19 If the individual answers
affirmatively, he or she must provide information about “any
treatment or counseling received.”20 Upon completion of SF-85, the
Government sends Form 42 to the individual’s current and former
landlords and references listed in SF-85.21 Form 42 then asks the
13. Id.
14. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.
15. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Respondents
at 21–22, Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (No. 09-530), 2010 WL 3183846, at *21–22 [hereinafter EFF
Brief].
16. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 761–63.
17. Id. at 752–53; Form 42, EDITTHIS.INFO, http://editthis.info/images/jpl_rebadging/e/ec/
Opm_form_inv_42.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2011); Standard Form 85, Questionnaire for NonSensitive Positions, U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT. (Sept. 1995), http://www.opm.gov/forms/
pdf_fill/SF85.pdf.
18. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 753.
19. Standard Form 85, Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions, supra note 17, at 5
(question fourteen).
20. Id.; see Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 753.
21. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 753.
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references open-ended questions bearing on the individual’s
“honesty and trustworthiness.”22 It also asks whether the references
know of any “adverse information” concerning “violations of law,”
“financial integrity,” “abuse of alcohol and/or drugs,” “mental or
emotional stability,” “general behavior or conduct,” or “other
matters.”23 If the references answer affirmatively, Form 42 calls for
an explanation.24
Following an initiative by the 9/11 Commission,25 the
Government informed the Employees that they had to complete the
background-check process.26 Any employee who failed to complete
the process before the deadline faced termination of employment.27
The Employees subsequently filed suit, alleging that the background
check violated their constitutional right to informational privacy.28
The Employees then moved for a preliminary injunction, less than
two weeks before the background-check deadline, on the basis that
the Government would fire them if they refused to submit to the
background check.29 The district court denied the request,30 but the
Ninth Circuit subsequently granted a temporary injunction pending
appeal.31
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged, and the Employees conceded,
that most of the background check questions were “unproblematic
and [did] not implicate the constitutional right to informational
privacy.”32 The court went on, however, to conclude that the district
court erred in holding that the Employees were not likely to succeed
22. Form 42, supra note 17.
23. Id.; see Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 753.
24. Form 42, supra note 17.
25. Since its creation, NASA has used a background-check process for federal, but not
contract, employees. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 752. This distinction changed in 2004, when the 9/11
Commission prompted President George W. Bush “to order new, uniform identification standards
for ‘[f]ederal employees,’ including ‘contractor employees.’” Id. (citing George W. Bush,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-12—Policy for a Common Identification
Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 27,
2004), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64578#axzz1ZZ0DTHD7). Thereafter, the
Department of Commerce implemented that initiative by “mandating that contract employees
with long-term access to federal facilities complete a standard background check . . . .” Id.
26. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 752.
27. Id.
28. Nelson v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 512 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir.), vacated,
530 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Nelson v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 506 F.3d 713, 715–16 (9th Cir. 2007).
32. Nelson, 530 F.3d at 878.
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on their privacy claim.33 As to SF-85, the Ninth Circuit held that the
compelled disclosure of information about treatment or counseling
for drug problems did not further the Government’s interest in
“uncovering and addressing illegal substance abuse” among the
Employees.34 To the contrary, the court noted, any treatment or
counseling that the Employees received for illegal drug use arguably
weakened the Government’s interest regarding drug problems.35 The
Ninth Circuit further held that the open-ended questions on Form 42
were not narrowly tailored to meet the Government’s interests in
verifying the Employees’ identities and ensuring security at the
Government’s facilities.36 Although the open-ended questions might
have solicited some information that was relevant to the
Government’s interests, because they were not narrowly tailored,
they likely violated the Employees’ informational privacy interest.37
The Supreme Court reversed.38 Relying heavily on the Privacy
Act’s nondisclosure requirement39 and the reasoning of Whalen and
Nixon, the Court held that the Government’s inquiries in SF-85 and
Form 42 did not violate a constitutional right to informational
privacy.40
III. REASONING OF
THE COURT
The issue in Nelson was twofold. First, assuming that an
individual admits to having “used, possessed, supplied, or
33. Id. at 879 (“Because SF 85 appears to compel disclosure of personal medical
information for which the government has failed to demonstrate a legitimate state interest, [the
Employees] are likely to succeed on this—albeit narrow—portion of their informational privacy
challenge to SF 85.”). First, a merits panel reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction; then,
the panel vacated its opinion to file a superseding opinion. Nelson, 512 F.3d 1134.
34. Nelson, 530 F.3d at 878–79.
35. Id. at 879.
36. Id. at 880. While the Government’s interests were legitimate, the questions were not
narrowly tailored:
[T]he form invites the recipient to reveal any negative information of which he or she
is aware. It is difficult to see how the vague solicitation of derogatory information
concerning the applicant’s “general behavior or conduct” and “other matters” could be
narrowly tailored to meet any legitimate need, much less the specific interests that [the
Government] ha[s] offered to justify the new requirement.
Id. at 881.
37. Id. at 881.
38. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 764 (2011).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2006).
40. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 763–64.
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manufactured illegal drugs” in the last year, does the Government’s
requirement41 that the individual then provide information on
treatment or counseling violate a putative right to informational
privacy, despite the Privacy Act’s protections?42 Second, if that
forced inquiry does not violate a putative right, does a follow-up,
open-ended question—concerning the honesty and truthfulness of, or
adverse information about, the individual43—violate a putative right,
despite the Privacy Act’s protections?
Justice Alito, writing for the unanimous Court,44 held no on
both. The questions that were included in the background check, in
conjunction with the Privacy Act’s safeguards against nonconsensual
disclosure, did not violate the Employees’ putative right to
informational privacy.45 In arriving at its decision, the Court began
by reviewing Whalen and Nixon.46 Whalen held that a New York
statute, which permitted the recording of names and addresses of
individuals who obtained certain drugs with a doctor’s prescription,
did not violate physicians’ and patients’ putative right to
informational privacy.47 Similarly, Nixon held that a statute, which
permitted the custody and screening of the former president’s
materials, did not unconstitutionally invade his putative right to
informational privacy.48
Adhering to the approach of those cases, the Court in Nelson
“assume[d] for present purposes that the Government’s challenged
inquiries implicate[d] a privacy interest of constitutional
41. The Employees had no meaningful choice of whether to refuse to submit to collection.
The background-check requirement left the Employees with a choice to surrender either their
privacy rights or their jobs. Brief for the Respondents at 56, Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (No. 09-530),
2010 WL 3048324, at *56 (“Respondents ‘are entitled, like all other persons, to the benefit of the
Constitution,’ and the government may not force them to choose ‘between surrendering their
constitutional rights or their jobs.’” (quoting Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v. Comm’r of
Sanitation of N.Y., 392 U.S. 280, 284–85 (1968))).
42. Brief for the Petitioners at I, Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (No. 09-530), 2010 WL 2031410,
at *I.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 22–23.
44. The vote was 8–0, but the Justices differed on the reasoning. Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas wrote concurring opinions. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 769
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case
because of her prior work on it as President Obama’s solicitor general. Bob Egelko, Court: Feds
Can Pry into NASA Scientists’ Lives, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 21, 2011, at C-2.
45. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 756–57.
46. Id. at 751.
47. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977).
48. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977).
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significance.”49 Although Justices Scalia and Thomas—who wrote
separate concurrences—urged the majority to hold that a
constitutional right to informational privacy does not exist, the Court
declined to provide a definitive answer.50 Instead, the Court
evaluated the Government’s interest in collecting the information and
determined that the Privacy Act’s protections shielded any privacy
interest at stake.51 Although the Court assumed that an informational
privacy right exists, it nevertheless found that the Government had a
strong interest in conducting the background check because
investigations of the Employees aided the Government in
“employing a competent, reliable workforce.”52 Thus, the Court
declined to interfere with the Government’s workplace decisions
because the Government—as an employer—had a strong interest in
managing its internal operations by conducting background checks.53
Next, the Court examined whether SF-85 and Form 42 furthered
the Government’s interest in managing its internal operations.54 The
Court held that SF-85’s inquiry into drug treatment and counseling
was a permissible follow-up question that furthered the
Government’s interest, because “[l]ike any employer, the
Government is entitled to have its projects staffed by reliable, lawabiding persons who will ‘efficiently and effectively’ discharge their
duties.”55 Regarding Form 42, the Court held that the open-ended
questions were “reasonably aimed at identifying capable employees
who will faithfully conduct the Government’s business.”56 Therefore,
the questions furthered the Government’s interest57—especially in
light of employers’ pervasive use of Form 42.58
Finally, the Court examined the protections that the Privacy Act
established and the extent to which those protections safeguarded the
Employees’ putative right to informational privacy.59 The Court held
that although the Privacy Act provides for exceptions to the
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 756.
Id. at 756 n.10.
Id. at 759, 761.
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 759–60.
Id. at 761.
Id.
Id. (“Form 42 alone is sent out by the Government over 1.8 million times annually.”).
Id. at 762.
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nondisclosure requirement, this was insufficient to show that the
Privacy Act failed to protect the Employees’ privacy interest.60 In
particular, the routine-use exception61—which allows for the
disclosure of information to the Employees’ references and to
authorized NASA employees who review the form for completion—
did not create “any undue risk of public dissemination.”62
Because the background check’s inquiries were reasonable and
employment-related in light of the Government’s interest in
managing its internal operations, and because the Privacy Act’s
nondisclosure requirement provided sufficient protection to the
Employees’ informational privacy interest, the Court held that the
Government’s background check did not violate a putative
constitutional right to informational privacy.63
IV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD THAT
THE PRIVACY ACT SUFFICIENTLY PROTECTS
THE EMPLOYEES’ RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
The Privacy Act of 197464 was a determining factor in the
Court’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of the background
check. The Privacy Act applied to all of the information that the
Government collected during its background-check process.65 The
Court relied on the Privacy Act in reasoning that “the information
collected is shielded by statute from ‘unwarranted disclosur[e].’”66
Thus, although the information that the background check collected
implicated the Employees’ right to informational privacy, the Court
reasoned that the Privacy Act alleviated that privacy concern by
providing sufficient protection that prevented the nonconsensual
dissemination of the Employees’ personal information.67
The Court’s reliance on the Privacy Act was flawed because it
glossed over an important, yet subtle, distinction: the right to privacy
is threatened by both the collection of information and the

60. Id.
61. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (2006).
62. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 763.
63. Id. at 763–64.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
65. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 753 (“All responses to SF-85 and Form 42 are subject to the
protections of the Privacy Act.”).
66. Id. at 762 (alteration in original) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977)).
67. Id. at 763.
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dissemination of that information.68 But the Court in Nelson was
prepared to address only the privacy interest that was implicated by
the dissemination of information.69 That raises the question: did the
Privacy Act sufficiently protect the Employees’ privacy interest that
was implicated by the collection of information?
A. Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974
and Its Routine-Use Exception
The Privacy Act regulates the federal government’s use of
personal information by placing limitations on the collection,
dissemination, and use of personal information in a system of
records.70 The Privacy Act allows an agency to maintain a system of
records that contains information about an individual that is “relevant
and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency” that is
authorized by law.71 The goal of the Privacy Act is “to strike a
delicate balance between the government’s need to gather and to use
personal information and the individual’s competing need to
maintain control over such personal information.”72 Thus, although
the Privacy Act permits an agency to maintain a system of records, it
also focuses on protecting individuals and their personal
information.73
68. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 36, 38 (“The distinction between
government collection and dissemination of private information is not irrelevant to the analysis
whether the government’s actions are constitutional.”); Brief Amici Curiae for the Respondents at
17, Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (No. 09-530), 2010 WL 3167310, at *17 (“The Privacy Act only limits
disclosure by the government; it does nothing to mitigate the privacy concerns raised by
collection of the information in the first place. Thus, it is not coextensive with the right to
informational privacy.”).
69. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 762 (“[The Employees] . . . attack only the Government’s
collection of information on SF-85 and Form 42. And here, no less than in Whalen and Nixon, the
information collected is shielded by statute from ‘unwarranted disclosur[e].’”).
70. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVACY ACT: OMB LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO
IMPROVE AGENCY COMPLIANCE 5 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03304.pdf.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (2006); Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 762.
72. Todd Robert Coles, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right to Privacy? An
Examination of the Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 957, 965 (1991). For a brief but
informative discussion on the history of events that led up to the enactment of the Privacy Act,
see HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE PRIVACY ACT: EMERGING ISSUES AND
RELATED LEGISLATION 1–4 (2002), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/
rl30824.pdf.
73. Indeed, the legislative history indicates that the Privacy Act’s “purpose . . . is to provide
certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion of personal privacy.” Privacy Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5, 88 Stat. 1986, 1905–09, amended by Pub. L. No. 95-38, § 5(g), 91
Stat. 179 (1977). Some scholars suggest that the reason behind this dual, competing purpose was
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At the heart of the Privacy Act’s protection of individuals is its
prohibition against the nonconsensual disclosure of personal
information.74 This requires that an individual give written consent
before an agency may disclose records that contain information
about the individual.75 This prohibition, however, is subject to many
exceptions that permit nonconsensual disclosure.76 Once an agency
determines that a disclosure falls under one of the twelve exceptions
to the Privacy Act, the agency only needs to keep a record of the
“date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure” and the “name and
address of the person or agency to whom the disclosure is made.”77
Thus, the burden on agencies to establish exceptions to the
nondisclosure requirement is quite low.78
The most contested exception in Nelson was the routine-use
exception.79 The routine-use exception allows for the nonconsensual
disclosure of information if the agency determines that disclosure is
“compatible with the purpose for which [the information] was
collected.”80 An agency must publish in the federal register81—and

a struggle between the House of Representatives and the Senate to reach a compromise. Coles,
supra note 72, at 970. The House wanted to facilitate the transfer of information among federal
agencies, while the Senate wanted to protect individuals by encouraging private enforcement and
greater remedies. Id. at 970–73.
74. “No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any
means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request
by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains . . . .” 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(b); see Coles, supra note 72, at 959.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b); Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 762.
76. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)–(12).
77. Id. § 552a(c)(1).
78. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Legal Scholars
and Technical Experts in Support of the Respondents at 25, Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (No. 09-530),
2010 WL 3167308, at *25 [hereinafter EPIC Brief].
79. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3); Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 762; see also Coles, supra note 72, at 975–
77 (discussing the legislative history of the routine-use exception and the compromise between
the House and Senate). The routine-use exception is one of the “most commonly abused
provisions of the Privacy Act.” The Privacy Act of 1974, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
http://epic.org/privacy/1974act/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2011). The Employees in Nelson did not
seriously contest the other eleven exceptions, although it is interesting to note that in previous,
unrelated litigation, other plaintiffs alleged that NASA relied on those exceptions. E.g., Henson v.
Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 14 F.3d 1143, 1145 (6th Cir. 1994) (dealing with the system
of records exception, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)).
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7); see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 5 n.6;
Coles, supra note 72, at 959.
81. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D).
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must inform each individual from whom it collects information82—
the routine uses for which the information may be disseminated.83
The Government’s system of records that it filed with the federal
registrar indicated multiple routine uses, two of which were critical
in Nelson: (1) disclosure when it requested information; and (2)
disclosure of the information that it collected.84 Thus, under the
routine-use exception, the Government could have disclosed
information in the Employees’ background checks when either (1)
disclosure was necessary to obtain information for a decision that
concerned the hiring or retention of the Employees; or (2) disclosure
was necessary to provide information to a federal agency, if that
agency requested it, regarding the hiring or retention of the
Employees.85 Essentially, this allowed the Government to disclose
information to (1) the Employees’ former landlords and references
who filled out Form 42, to allow them to identify the employee;86
and (2) other employees who reviewed SF-85, to verify that the
Employees provided all of the requested information.87
B. The Privacy Act Does Not Adequately
Protect the Right to Informational
Privacy That Is Threatened by the
Compelled Collection of Information88
The Court repeatedly emphasized that the Privacy Act shielded
the Employees’ information from unwarranted dissemination.89 What
the Court did not address, however, was whether the Privacy Act
protected a right to informational privacy that was threatened by the

82. SF-85 put the Employees on notice of the Government’s routine uses. Brief for the
Respondents, supra note 41, at 43. The information in SF-85 was different, however, from that
which the Government submitted to the Federal Register. EPIC Brief, supra note 78, at 26–27.
Moreover, Form 42 did not list the routine uses. Id.
83. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(C).
84. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Notice of Proposed Revisions
to an Existing Privacy Act System of Records, 71 Fed. Reg. 45859-02, 45862 (proposed revision
Aug. 10, 2006) [hereinafter NASA Notice of Proposed Revisions] (listing the routine uses in
Appendix B).
85. Id.
86. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 753, 763 (2011).
87. Id. at 763.
88. Recall that the Employees essentially had no meaningful choice regarding whether to
submit to the background-check process. See supra note 41.
89. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 761–63 (discussing the statutory protection of unwarranted
disclosure).
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collection of information itself.90 The Privacy Act does not
adequately protect against a threat to the right to informational
privacy like the one that was implicated by the background checks’
compelled collection of information,91 and the Court should not have
glossed over the distinction between collection and dissemination.92
That the collection of personal information implicates a privacy
interest has been clear since the Privacy Act’s beginnings. Congress
was influenced by the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on
Automated Personal Data Systems and that committee’s 1973
report,93 which set forth a “Code of Fair Information Practices.”94
That code listed five principles, and Congress in turn refined the five
principles to eight—each of which exists in the Privacy Act’s
requirements.95 One of the eight principles stated, “There shall be
limits on the types of information an organization may collect about
an individual . . . .”96 This principle was distinct from another:
“There shall be limits on the external disclosures of information
about an individual a record-keeping organization may make.”97
Thus, Congress intended for the actions—collection and

90. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 43 (“[T]he Privacy Act—which as relevant
here limits only dissemination, and not collection, of personal information . . . .”).
91. Moreover, while the Privacy Act does provide measures that protect against the
nonconsensual dissemination of information, even those measures are inadequate to protect
against threats to a right to privacy. See infra Part IV.C.
92. Perhaps the lack of discussion of why collection of information implicates a privacy
right was one way for the Court to narrow the scope of the putative right to informational
privacy—a narrowing that the Court might have preferred given the lack of precedent on the
scope of such a right. See EPIC Brief, supra note 78, at 20; see also The Supreme Court, 2010
Term—Leading Cases, 125 HARV. L. REV. 231, 239 (2011) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (“It
makes sense that in an area with murkier law, and with a right that has more widely felt practical
implications, the Court would continue to be wary of a broad ruling’s likelihood ‘to go wrong.’”
(footnotes omitted)).
93. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS
OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL
DATA SYSTEM viii (1973), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/DATACNCL/1973privacy/
tocprefacemembers.htm.
94. PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY:
THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION 501 (1977), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/c13.htm.
95. Id. at 501–02.
96. This is known as the Collection Limitation Principle. Id. at 502.
97. This is known as the Disclosure Limitation Principle. Id.
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dissemination—to be distinct, yet of comparable significance, for the
Privacy Act’s requirements.98
Moreover, both Whalen and Nixon drew a distinction between
collection and dissemination of information—recognizing that
although dissemination is often more intrusive and more likely than
collection is to rise to a violation of the right to informational
privacy, collection of sensitive information can, by itself, constitute
an impermissible invasion of privacy.99 Although the two cases
distinguished between collection and dissemination, neither case
expressly limited the right to informational privacy to situations that
exclusively involve dissemination.100
For example, Whalen stated that individuals have an “interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”101 And Whalen
acknowledged that someone can protect that interest either by
refusing to disclose personal information to the collection agency or
by requiring the collection agency to guard the information carefully
to prevent disclosure to the public.102 Indeed, Whalen noted that
“[r]equir[ed] . . . disclosure[] to representatives of the State”—the
collection of information—implicates a privacy interest.103 Whalen
then hinted that compelled collection might, but does not
automatically, amount to an invasion of privacy.104 Moreover, in first

98. See generally Haeji Hong, Dismantling the Private Enforcement of the Privacy Act of
1974: Doe v. Chao, 38 AKRON L. REV. 71, 80–83 (2005) (summarizing the principles and history
behind the Privacy Act).
99. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 36–37. Other courts have similarly reached
the conclusion that the collection of information implicates a right to informational privacy. Id. at
39 n.18 (listing cases). For example, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the right to information
privacy “applies both when an individual chooses not to disclose highly sensitive information to
the government and when an individual seeks assurance that such information will not be made
public.” Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 789–90 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977)); accord Shuman v. City of Phila., 470 F. Supp.
449, 458 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (“If there is a constitutionally protected ‘zone-of-privacy’, compelled
disclosure in and of itself may be an invasion of that zone, and therefore, a violation of protected
rights. Absent a strong countervailing state interest, disclosure of private matters should not be
compelled.”).
100. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 36.
101. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.
102. See id. at 605–06 (“We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information . . . . The right to collect and use such data
for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to
avoid unwarranted disclosures.”); EFF Brief, supra note 15, at 21–22 (citing cases including
Whalen).
103. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602; Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 36–37.
104. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602; Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 36–37.
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crafting the putative right to informational privacy,105 Whalen cited
Professor Kurland for the assertion that there are three facets of the
right to privacy, one of which is the “right of the individual to be free
in action, thought, experience, and belief from governmental
compulsion.”106 Professor Kurland distinguished this right from “the
right of an individual not to have his private affairs made public.”107
Thus, Whalen, by relying on Professor Kurland for guidance,
distinguished between freedom of action, which includes the
compelled collection of information, and improper dissemination—
both of which implicate a putative right to informational privacy.108
Similarly, Nixon concluded that the former president’s privacy
rights were threatened the moment that he was forced to submit to
collection of his personal papers.109 Nixon recognized that the
collection threatened a privacy right simply by the submission of the
papers to government employees110 who sorted the private
documents from the public documents.111 Thus, even though there
was no disclosure to the public because a statute required the former
president’s private papers to be returned to him,112 Nixon nonetheless
recognized that the short-term collection of personal papers
threatened the former president’s privacy right.113
105. The Court crafted the putative right from its previous decisions of Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and others that delineated the
right to privacy. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598 n.23.
106. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.24 (quoting Phillip Kurland, The Private I, UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO MAGAZINE (Autumn 1976)).
107. Id. (quoting Kurland, supra note 106).
108. Id. at 599 & n.24, 600.
109. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457–58, 465 (1977) (“We may
assume . . . that this pattern of de facto Presidential control and congressional acquiescence gives
rise to appellant’s legitimate expectation of privacy in such materials.”). But the Nixon Court
ultimately held that the public interest outweighed his privacy interest. Id. at 465.
110. It is interesting to note that those employees had an “unblemished record . . . for
discretion.” Id. at 465.
111. Id. at 457–58 (discussing the problem of mingling personal documents with public
documents and how this gives rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy); EFF Brief, supra note
15, at 22.
112. The statute at issue in Nixon was the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation
Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (2006).
113. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458–59. “The very fact that the Court considered whether Nixon’s
informational privacy rights had been violated, when public dissemination was not an issue, lends
strong support to the notion that informational privacy concerns may be triggered by the mere
collection of information.” Russell T. Gorkin, Comment, The Constitutional Right to
Informational Privacy: NASA v. Nelson, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 1, 7
(2010). Nixon, which focused on a Fourth Amendment claim, never went on to analyze the
former president’s claim that his privacy interest was threatened by the collection of information,
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Interestingly, the Court in Nelson did acknowledge that Whalen
and Nixon each conceded that collection of information might
threaten a putative privacy interest.114 The Court stated, “Both
Whalen and Nixon recognized that government ‘accumulation’ of
‘personal information’ for ‘public purposes’ may pose a threat to
privacy.”115 But the Court did not apply that precedent to determine
whether the Privacy Act sufficiently protected the privacy interest
that was threatened by the compelled collection of the Employees’
information.116 Instead, the Court jumped to its determination of
whether the Privacy Act’s statutory protections alleviated the entirety
of the Employees’ privacy claims because the Privacy Act
sufficiently protected against unwarranted dissemination.117
Had the Court acknowledged that the compelled collection of
information threatened the Employees’ informational privacy
interest, the Court would have been faced with the question of
whether the Privacy Act sufficiently protects that interest.118 Simply
put, the Privacy Act does not. Its requirements for collection are too
broad for it to protect against the threats to privacy that are created
by the compelled collection of personal information.119 The Privacy
Act’s two main requirements for collection are: (1) the information
collected must be “relevant and necessary” to accomplish a purpose
of the agency that is required by law; and (2) the agency, “to the
greatest extent practicable[,]” should attempt to collect information
directly from the individual.120
and therefore never answered the question of “what information an individual can prohibit the
government from collecting, and when, if it all, this prohibition can be overcome.” Id.; see Nixon,
433 U.S. at 460.
114. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2011).
115. Id. (citing Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457–58; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977)).
116. See Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 762 (“[H]ere, no less than in Whalen and Nixon, the
information collected is shielded by statute from ‘unwarranted disclosur[e].’ The Privacy Act,
which covers all information collected during the background-check process, allows the
Government to maintain records ‘about an individual’ only to the extent the records are ‘relevant
and necessary to accomplish’ a purpose authorized by law.” (citations omitted)).
117. Id. at 761 (“Both Whalen and Nixon recognized that government ‘accumulation’ of
‘personal information’ for ‘public purposes’ may pose a threat to privacy. But both decisions also
stated that a ‘statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures’ generally allays these
privacy concerns.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
118. See id. (reasoning that statutes may shield threats to privacy).
119. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (2006) (regulating the maintenance, manner of collection, and
disclosure of personal information, but limiting the type of information that can be collected to
that which is “relevant and necessary” to accomplish a purpose of the agency that is required by
law).
120. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1)–(2).
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The Court did not address either requirement.121 As to the first,
the Court repeatedly asserted that the questions were reasonable and
related to employment,122 but it never deemed the collection to be
relevant and necessary to an end that was required by law.123 As to
the second requirement, the Government collected information from
the Employees’ former landlords and references—information that it
did not collect directly from the individuals.124 Still, given the
Privacy Act’s vague language,125 in conjunction with the Court’s
ultimate finding that the questions were reasonable,126 the Court
might have held that the Government’s collection of information met
the Privacy Act’s two requirements.
But just because the Government satisfied the Privacy Act’s
requirements did not guarantee that the Privacy Act did an adequate
job of protecting the Employees’ privacy interest. Indeed, a recent
study demonstrates that, despite the Privacy Act’s requirements,
many agencies overcollect information because they do not assess
the relevance of or need for such information.127 And the current
degree of agency and congressional oversight is inadequate for
agencies to determine what is actually relevant and necessary for
them to prevent or remedy overcollection.128 Until Congress takes
action and mandates more specific requirements for collection under

121. See Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 762–63 (noting that the safeguards in the Privacy Act
“‘evidence a proper concern’ for individual privacy” with respect to disclosure, without
discussing whether or not such safeguards properly protect the individual’s privacy interest
against compelled collection).
122. Id. at 759–61 (repeating “reasonable”).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1). The Court denied that it had to determine whether the questions
were necessary: “We reject the argument that the Government . . . has a constitutional burden to
demonstrate that its questions are ‘necessary’ . . . .” Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 760. While there is a
distinction between determining whether specific questions themselves were necessary and
determining whether the collection of information was necessary, under the Court’s reasoning—
that proving that the questions were necessary was too great a burden—perhaps the Court would
have found that collection was also not necessary and therefore did not meet the Privacy Act’s
first requirement, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1).
124. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 753.
125. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1)–(2) (using such terms as “relevant,” “necessary,” and “to the
greatest extent practicable” without defining them or explaining what they mean).
126. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 759–61.
127. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 14–15. This is even more
problematic for electronic records, which are easier to collect. Id. at 43; Leading Cases, supra
note 92, at 238–39.
128. Coles, supra note 72, at 990 (“Current oversight and enforcement efforts have been
unsuccessful in preventing widespread abuse of the Privacy Act. Federal agencies have been
unwilling to police themselves.”).
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the Privacy Act,129 the only adequate protection is to not collect
information in the first place because “information not collected
about an individual cannot be misused.”130
In sum, although the dissemination of personal information is
often more intrusive than the collection of that information, “[w]hen
the government compels individuals to relinquish control of sensitive
personal information, the harm to personal dignity can be profound,
regardless of how widely and to whom the information is later
disseminated.”131 The Employees’ informational privacy right
involved more than just an interest in limiting the dissemination of
their personal information; their privacy right also included an
interest in curtailing the collection of that information.132 The
Privacy Act, however, does not adequately protect against threats to
a putative right to information privacy that is implicated by the
compelled collection of information.
C. The Privacy Act Does Not Adequately Protect
a Right to Informational Privacy That Is Threatened
by the Improper Dissemination of Information
The Privacy Act is also inadequate to protect the privacy interest
that is threatened by improper, nonconsensual dissemination.133 The
Privacy Act has twelve exceptions that swallow the rule against the
nonconsensual dissemination of information.134 In particular, the
129. Id. (“[T]he efforts of Congress . . . to provide guidance and to ensure compliance have
met with limited success. . . . Ultimately, it is the flawed statutory enforcement and oversight
scheme that is responsible for the failings of the Privacy Act.”).
130. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 14 (quoting Notice of Privacy Act
Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28949, 28960 (July 9, 1975)).
131. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 40.
132. EPIC Brief, supra note 78, at 11 (“[P]rivacy is not simply the limit on the disclosure of
personal information.”).
133. Another inadequacy—which should be noted but is not discussed at length in this
Comment—is the lack of proper remedies for violations of the Privacy Act: individuals may only
obtain monetary relief for intentional and willful violations. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2006); Nat’l
Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 763 n.15 (2011); Coles, supra note 72, at
992–94 & n.236; Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1168 (2002); see also Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 616, 627
(2004) (holding that plaintiffs must prove that some actual damages resulted from a federal
agency’s intentional or willful violation of the Privacy Act of 1974 in order to qualify for the
minimum award of $1,000 that the statute provides as compensation for such a violation).
134. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)–(12); see also Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals
in the Hands of Government: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 479–80 (1995) (“[T]he Privacy Act is a paper tiger. . . . [T]he Act’s
substantive provisions are riddled with loopholes and laced with exceptions.”).
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routine-use exception that was at issue in Nelson “has threatened to
emasculate the Privacy Act’s protection of individual privacy.”135
The Court, in concluding that the Government’s established
routine uses were not too broad, reasoned that those routine uses did
not specifically authorize a release of the information to the public;
instead, the Government released the information only to other
employees and to the Employees’ references and landlords.136
Although the Government’s routine uses did not facially permit a
disclosure to the public, the Court’s conclusion—that there was
necessarily only a remote possibility that the information could be
disclosed to the public137—was flawed because it did not take into
consideration the modern reality of the abuse of the exception.138
In Nelson, the Government, in attempting to comply with the
Privacy Act’s provisions,139 gave notice to the federal register and
the Employees that its routine uses included disclosure for collection
and disclosure for dissemination.140 The Court reasoned that these
routine uses were “limited, reasonable steps designed to complete the
background-check process in an efficient and orderly manner.”141
Moreover, because only references and other employees could
review the information, the Court concluded that “[t]he ‘remote
possibility’ of public disclosure created by these narrow ‘routine
use[s]’ does not undermine the Privacy Act’s substantial
protections.”142
As the Court noted, an “ironclad disclosure bar” is unnecessary
to protect an informational privacy interest.143 The routine-use
exception, however, is far from ironclad. And the Court’s reliance on
Whalen and Nixon—for the assertion that protections do not need to
be ironclad144—is undermined by several distinctions between those
cases and Nelson. First, neither of the earlier cases dealt with the
135. Coles, supra note 72, at 959.
136. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 763.
137. Id.
138. The routine-use exception has long been criticized as the exception that swallows the
rule. E.g., Solove, supra note 133, at 1167–68.
139. See supra note 82.
140. NASA Notice of Proposed Revisions, supra note 84 (listing routine uses in Appendix
B).
141. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 763.
142. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 601–02 (1977)).
143. Id. at 762.
144. Id.
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Privacy Act or its exceptions. The statutes in Whalen and Nixon had
their own distinct exceptions to nondisclosure.145 The statutory
exceptions that permitted disclosure in Whalen and Nixon, therefore,
had no bearing on whether the routine-use exception at issue in
Nelson was too porous to protect a privacy interest.146 Second,
neither Whalen nor Nixon dealt with dissemination to persons outside
of the agency; rather, the exception in each case was for
dissemination to other employees.147 But in Nelson, one of the
Government’s routine-use exceptions permitted disclosure to
nonemployees such as references and former landlords.148 Finally,
there was no evidence that the other NASA employees, unlike the
employees in Nixon, had spotless records.149 Thus, while there may
have been only a remote possibility of public disclosure given the
narrow exceptions in Whalen and Nixon, those exceptions are distinct
from the Privacy Act’s routine-use exception. Therefore, it does not
necessarily follow that there was only a remote possibility of public
disclosure in Nelson.
Moreover, criticism of the routine-use exception is
widespread.150 Essentially, the exception only requires agencies to
plan in advance for disclosure and to comply with minimal
procedural requirements.151 Thus, it threatens to eliminate one of the
Privacy Act’s central purposes: to protect individual privacy
rights.152 As noted, agencies must meet minimal requirements,
including reviewing routine-use disclosures by keeping a record.153
145. The statute in Whalen was N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3371 (McKinney 1973). Whalen,
429 U.S. at 594 & n.12 (listing nondisclosure exceptions, including disclosure to employees). The
statute in Nixon was the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107 (1970). Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 429, 431 (1977).
146. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 762 (“[T]oo porous to supply a meaningful check against
‘unwarranted disclosures.’” (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605)).
147. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 462 (describing the archivists’ screening and collection procedures
pursuant to their authority under 44 U.S.C. § 2107); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 594 & n.12 (citing N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3371).
148. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 753.
149. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 462 (“[U]nblemished record for discretion.” (quoting Nixon v.
Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 365 (D.D.C. 1976))).
150. E.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public
Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 584–86 (1995) (“Not only is the
‘routine use’ exemption applied in a fashion that ignores relevant statutory language, such agency
practice continues despite prolonged and well-placed criticism of it.”).
151. Major John F. Joyce, The Privacy Act: A Sword and a Shield but Sometimes Neither, 99
MIL. L. REV. 113, 157 (1983).
152. Coles, supra note 72, at 979–80.
153. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(1) (2006).
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Some agencies fail to adhere to this requirement.154 For example, one
report found that, in 2,400 different systems of records, 18 percent of
agencies did not review routine-use disclosures to ensure that the
disclosures continued to comply with the purposes for which the
information had been collected.155 Given this abuse of the exception,
“agencies cannot assure the public that the potential uses of their
personal information remains appropriate.”156 Moreover, although an
agency must give notice of routine uses,157 it has become common
for agencies to eliminate the effectiveness of this requirement by
broadly wording their routine-use notices.158 As agencies craft their
own routine uses, which are subject only to the vague requirement
that the uses be compatible with the purpose for which the records
had been originally collected,159 they can essentially create their own
exceptions to the Privacy Act’s prohibition against nonconsensual
disclosure.160 Thus, even though the Government’s routine uses did
not explicitly permit disclosure to the public, the Court should not
have ignored the reality of the abuse of the routine-use exception and
the potential for disclosure to the public.
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the Court should not have even continued Whalen and
Nixon’s tradition of assuming, without deciding, that a constitutional
right to informational privacy exists.161 But because the Court in
Nelson did just that, it had to ascertain whether any statutory
requirements shielded the Employees’ putative right to informational
privacy. Nelson’s holding hinged on the assertion that, like the
statutory protections in Whalen and Nixon, the Privacy Act’s
154. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 17, 50.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 17.
157. The agency must give notice to the federal register, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D), and to
individuals who provide information, id. § 552a(e)(3)(C).
158. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 50.
159. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).
160. EPIC Brief, supra note 78, at 25–26.
161. “Thirty-three years have passed since the Court first suggested that the right may, or
may not, exist. It is past time for the Court to abandon this Alfred Hitchcock line of our
jurisprudence.” Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 767 (2011) (Scalia,
J., concurring). But see Leading Cases, supra note 92, at 232 (“Although Nelson may not answer
many of the questions that persist about informational privacy, the Court correctly declined to
dictate the contours of that right at a time when its practical and legal implications remain
difficult to anticipate.”).
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requirement against nonconsensual public disclosure was adequate to
protect the Employees’ informational privacy interest. But the Court
did not address how the Privacy Act warded off the privacy threat
that was created by the background check’s collection of personal
information. Moreover, the Court failed to acknowledge the reality
that the Privacy Act’s routine-use exception swallows the rule
against nonconsensual public disclosure, thereby causing
dissemination of more personal information than the Privacy Act
actually intended to allow. Consequently, the Court should not have
held that the Privacy Act sufficiently protected the Employees’
putative constitutional right to informational privacy that was
implicated by the Government’s background checks. If, as will likely
happen, background checks and compelled collection of information
become more widespread,162 then Nelson will be even more
meaningful to citizens and their “interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters.”163

162. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 758 (“[M]ore than 88% of U.S. companies . . . perform background
checks on their employees.” (alteration in original) (quoting Brief Amicus Curiae of Consumer
Data Industry Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioners at 2, Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (09-530), 2010
WL 2185134, at *2)); John E. Matejkovic & Margaret E. Matejkovic, Whom to Hire: Rampart
Misrepresentations of Credentials Mandate the Prudent Employer Make Informed Hiring
Decisions, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 827, 829 (2006) (“82% of employers surveyed in 2003
conducted applicant background investigations, up from 66% in 1996.” (citing How to Do
Background Checks Properly, HRFOCUS, Aug. 1, 2004, at 11)).
163. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 599 (1977).

498

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:477

